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In December 2015 world leaders agreed upon a new global climate agree-
ment in an attempt to limit the global temperature increase to 2 degrees 
Celsius. Despite the general optimism after the Paris agreement and well-
intended new commitments during the recent Marrakech conference, 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are growing strongly in developing coun-
tries, where there is a desire for prosperity. If the dual challenge of reducing 
GHG emissions and achieving economic development cannot be addressed, 
the world will fail to meet the desired climate targets.
 • GHG emissions continue to grow, which threatens climate stabilisation. This 
growth now comes mostly from the developing world, and many developing 
countries are on a CO2-intensive development path.
 • The Paris agreement will not be more than the sum of its parts. The aggregate 
climate protection efforts that result from country-level nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs) are very likely to fall short of the mitigation actions need-
ed for climate stabilisation.
 • There is a lack of concrete actions by a number of developing countries. Do-
mestic climate policy is either inexistent in certain states or the policies imple-
mented are insufficient, as we illustrate with evidence from Indonesia, Mexico, 
South Africa, and Thailand.
 • The huge gap between the objectives of the Paris agreement and what is hap-
pening “on the ground” reflects significant barriers to decarbonising the world’s 
energy and transport systems. The short-term economic, political, and social 
costs of reforms are key barriers. 
Policy Implications
Developing countries cannot be blamed for their economic development ambi-
tions. To trigger the transformational change required to curb GHG emissions 
calls for immediate policy responses. International agreements and cooperation 
need to support emerging middle-income economies with a clear focus on miti-
gation actions that matter, such as – in particular – taxing carbon through green 
fiscal reform. At the same time, climate finance for low-income economies should 
systematically seek to prevent lock-in effects.
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The Paris Agreement and Developing Countries Emissions
The influence of human activity on the climate is increasingly considered to be se-
cured knowledge. To limit the average global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels, global GHG emissions would need to be reduced drasti-
cally. By how much each country should reduce its emission level has always been 
and continues to be a major dispute at the international policy level. Current global 
GHG emission levels are dominated by low- and mostly middle-income countries: 
they account for two-thirds of global emissions, though this is rising (Figure 1). 
Due to the widely differing understandings of assuming responsibility, interna-
tional climate negotiations have been deadlocked for years. Despite the importance 
of a normative discussion on emission responsibility, the low- and, in particular, 
middle-income countries will have to substantially contribute to climate mitiga-
tion even if developed economies undertake major efforts. The situation has been 
exacerbated by growing evidence that the world is already almost locked into a 1.5 
degree Celsius increase until the middle of the century (World Bank 2014). 
Major movement occurred at the international policy stage with the adoption of 
the first-ever universal and legally binding global climate deal at the Paris climate 
conference in December 2015. Because of quick ratification by a sufficient number 
of parties, the agreement entered into force (on 4 November 2016) much faster 
than many anticipated. Unlike the 1997 Kyoto protocol, all states are expected to set 
mitigation goals, including the large low- and middle-income countries. NDCs are 
unilaterally determined and supposed to reflect a country’s ability to contribute to 
mitigation efforts. A look into developing countries’ published intended nationally 
determined contributions (INDCs) – intended since they were submitted for the 
Paris climate conference – reveals three major issues which make the assessment of 
emission reductions and the economic implications thereof difficult. First, emission 
reduction goals are usually stated relative to a baseline scenario which is easy to 
adjust to achieve large projected emission reductions. Second, mitigation goals are 
typically formulated according to two different scenarios. Unilateral goals are less 
ambitious than goals that can be achieved by drawing on bilateral or multilateral as-
Figure 1
International Green-
house Gas Emission 
Shares, 2014
Source: Olivier et al. 
2015.
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sistance. Third, INDCs, and possibly NDCs, rarely contain any specific policy details 
or further steps on how emission reductions can be achieved. 
In general, most INDCs from developing countries place strong emphasis on 
economic development, which reflects their legitimate interest in raising the liv-
ing standards of their populations. This inconvenient truth may threaten success-
ful climate stabilisation. The ratified Paris agreement will only be implemented in 
2020, at a time when an ever-larger fraction of energy infrastructure will already be 
locked into fossil fuels (IEA 2015). The cost of replacing this infrastructure will be 
very large, and the corresponding investments are unlikely to be undertaken by a 
country that has to (first) address numerous development challenges. 
One year after the Paris agreement and following the subsequent climate con-
ference in Marrakech in November 2016, the issue of unambitious emission reduc-
tion targets remains unresolved. In rich countries like Germany, plans for more 
ambitious national climate policies have come under attack by industry and labour 
unions, whereas a group of developing countries (organised in the Climate Vulnera-
ble Forum) announced their intention to completely transform their energy systems 
to renewables as quickly as possible. While correctly applauded for its ambition, 
this pledge – like many other emission reduction promises – will have to stand the 
test of reality. Enthusiastic statements in the spotlight of climate conferences are 
relatively easy to make; rapidly transforming energy systems from fossil fuels to re-
newables, however, comes at a price that many low- and middle-income economies 
are unable or unwilling to pay – at least by themselves. 
Development and Emission Trajectories 
In terms of human development, the past three decades have been an enormous 
success in large parts of the world due to high economic growth in many develop-
ing countries. The worldwide poverty headcount ratio at USD 1.9 per day decreased 
from 44 per cent in 1981 to 12.7 per cent in 2012. A large share of the global popu-
lation that escaped extreme poverty can be found in India and especially China, 
though many other developing countries have also experienced substantial reduc-
tions in extreme poverty. Figure 2 reveals several middle-income countries (i.e. In-
donesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Thailand) that can be considered major emitters 
among the “other middle-income” group in Figure 1. All of these countries have 
seen economic growth that was accompanied by a considerable reduction in ex-
treme poverty over the past 20 years. At the same time, the two fast-growing Asian 
economies of Indonesia and Thailand exhibit growth rates in emissions per capita 
that even exceed the growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. We 
use the experiences of these countries with regard to their development paths, en-
ergy consumption, and climate change policies to illustrate some of the key chal-
lenges faced by developing countries in contributing to climate change mitigation.
Figure 2 shows that the above-mentioned Asian economies are not the only 
cases in which high GDP growth rates have been accompanied by sharp increases 
in CO2 emissions. It appears that the income–emission trajectories of countries 
like China, India, and Indonesia closely track the historical emissions of European 
developed economies (see Figure 3). South Africa’s energy system, which relies al-
most exclusively on coal and has much higher per capita emissions, is an exception 
   4    GIGA FOCUS | GLOBAL | NO. 8 | DECEMBER 2016 
here. Against this background, the less ambitious emission reduction targets from 
developing countries, as exemplified by INDC communications, are hardly surpris-
ing. As a result, the aggregate emission reduction pledges in the Paris agreement 
will not come even close to achieving the maximum temperature increase of 2 de-
grees Celsius. Several global simulation studies have come to the conclusion that 
even with the currently planned worldwide emission reductions, the temperature 









of Major High- and 
Middle-Income Coun-
tries
Source: GDP data 
from Maddison (2010) 
and CO2 Emissions from 
CDIAC (2013).
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Decarbonising Energy Systems
Because energy use is the main driver of GHG emissions, the decarbonisation of 
energy systems is regarded as crucial for mitigating climate change. There are ongo-
ing debates about the costs and (co-)benefits associated with transforming energy 
systems into low-carbon systems based on renewable energy. Recent studies by the 
World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have suggested that if climate protection measures are able to reorient 
growth paths towards “low-carbon development,” they could have positive effects 
on economic growth (OECD 2011; Hallegatte 2012). In particular, decentralised en-
ergy systems that rely on renewable energy sources have been identified as potential 
providers of universal access to energy and creators of win-win situations in the 
fight against poverty, climate change, and environmental degradation (Casillas and 
Kammen 2010). Renewable energy will play the key role in the transformation pro-
cess towards large-scale low-carbon energy systems. However, and despite its huge 
potential, renewable energy is often more expensive than fossil fuels – albeit wind 
energy and solar energy are becoming increasingly competitive (IRENA 2015). This 
partly explains why fossil fuels continue to play a central role in economic develop-
ment. Yet, while the costs of renewables matter, other economic, technological, and 
institutional factors also hinder progress in decarbonising energy systems. This can 
be seen amongst the mid-sized middle-income emerging economies that we have 
studied in more detail.
Most middle-income economies have plans to significantly increase the share of 
renewable energy in total electricity production (Figure 4). With the exception of 
South Africa, most of these plans are fairly ambitious. Mexico plans to provide 35 
per cent of total electricity via renewable energy by the year 2030. Other middle-in-
come countries have also announced to reach ambitious renewable targets by 2030. 
India, for instance, wants renewables to account for 40 per cent of its total electric-
ity production by 2030. Considering the fact that there are only 13 years left to meet 
these targets and the fact that wind and solar energy entail higher electricity pro-
duction costs, little is known about how these countries plan to reach these goals. 
Figure 4
Electricity Produc-
tion from Renewable 
Sources (% of total)
Source: REN21.
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At the same time, most middle-income countries with aspirational renewable tar-
gets further invest in coal-fired power plants. Figure 5 shows an illustrative projec-
tion of what the planned addition of coal-fired power plant capacity would mean 
for the share of coal-based electricity production (extrapolating average electricity-
production growth rates for the 15 years up until 2030). In Indonesia and South 
Africa the resulting shares would decline by around 10 percentage points. This de-
cline is down to reduced growth of additional coal capacity rather than an absolute 
reduction in electricity from coal. For some of these countries (e.g. Indonesia and 
Thailand) growth rates in total installed coal capacity are above 100 per cent. In 
Thailand the share of coal in total electricity production may even increase. Another 
case in point is India, where there are plans to massively expand electricity produc-
tion from coal in order to satisfy the growing energy demand from industry and the 
population. Other countries have smaller planned growth rates, but the reasons 
and implications differ. While China and South Africa already have high levels of 
coal use in their power sectors, they still plan to increase capacity by large absolute 
levels. This is particularly problematic in the case of China due to the size of the 
economy. Mexico, in contrast, is the only large middle-income country that is not 
investing in further coal plants, supposedly directly reflected in ambitious renew-
able energy targets. The main reason, however, is that Mexico has abundant gas re-
serves – a fuel that is planned to be the backbone of the power sector for decades to 
come. Although often described as a transition energy source due to having a lower 
carbon content, increased energy demand caused by economic growth will also sig-
nificantly increase total carbon emissions. Ultimately, the fact that emissions in 
these countries can be expected to rise significantly despite the propagated growth 
of renewable energy supply, reflect the deceptive character of the Paris agreement, 
which is a consequence of the use of business-as-usual scenarios in NDCs. 
These developments put at risk the success of the Paris agreement, particularly 
since (i) investments in the power sector require long-term commitments and (ii) 
a major share of the energy infrastructure in developing countries will already be 
based on fossil fuels by 2020 (IEA 2015). Additionally, most major middle-income 
emitters go beyond this point and plan to further deploy coal-fired power plants. 
The “renaissance of coal” and the rise of gas thus fill the gaps left by unambitious 
Figure 5
Electricity Production 
from Coal (% of total)
Source: World Bank 
2016. 
Note: Coal electric-
ity production in 2030 
is calculated with 
expected installed capac-
ity growth based on 
Coalswarm (2016). Total 
projected electricity pro-
duction in 2030 is based 
on average growth rates 
from 1999 to 2013. 
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renewable targets that are insufficient to secure emission reductions. Even worse, 
these targets are largely promises with little legislative backup. 
What to Do? Instruments and Barriers to Mitigation
The above account shows that there is a huge gap between the objectives of the 
Paris agreement and what is happening “on the ground.” In our view this gap mir-
rors a huge discrepancy between the global policy discourse on “transforming the 
world” and what seem to be politically feasible and practical solutions and policies. 
We believe that there are significant barriers to decarbonising the world’s energy 
and transport systems, which are typically linked to the short-term economic and 
political costs of reform. These barriers will need to be identified, understood, and 
systematically tackled by placing emphasis on the effectiveness of contributing to 
global mitigation without ignoring the costs. 
To enable economic growth while reducing GHG emissions, there are only a 
limited number of policy instruments available for countries willing to act. When 
renewable energy is more expensive than fossil energy, offsetting the price differ-
ence by taxing fossil fuels or subsidising the deployment of renewables are the two 
main options. Any such policy will typically involve economic costs and how these 
costs are distributed is crucial for its political feasibility and success. 
Taxing fossil energy will make energy used by households more expensive. In 
developing countries, since poor people usually use less energy processing devices 
(e.g. fridges and cars) than rich people, energy price rises hit the rich harder than 
the poor. Although this may sound like good news, income losses for the poor are 
a reality that needs to be tackled. In the absence of income tax systems with full 
information on individual incomes, identifying appropriate policies to redistribute 
tax revenue is a challenge on its own. Practical issues in identifying the losers of po-
tential energy price reforms is a large disincentive for more ambitious climate poli-
cies – a point that is often overlooked in climate policy discussions. Furthermore, 
political decisions may not be taken in favour of a poor majority, but rather to cater 
to the interests of richer, typically urban, elites.
Another effect on household income and welfare may come from the labour 
market. Higher energy prices for industrial sectors may lead to reductions in wages, 
thus hurting workers. On top of that, with more ambitious climate policies, un-
employment may rise if cost pressures in energy-intensive sectors lead to employ-
ment losses. The claim that so-called green jobs will compensate for job losses in 
traditional industries is questionable. While renewable energy supply indeed re-
quires more manpower, costs are currently higher, and the net job effect may at best 
be neutral. Additionally, most developing countries, with the exception of China 
and India, have little to offer in terms of exporting renewable energy technologies, 
which appears to be essential to the realisation of a green job miracle. It is a reason-
able assumption that governments in developing countries are well aware of these 
potential problems. Even small steps towards a low-carbon economy may prove dif-
ficult because of the political economy of energy pricing. This is clearly illustrated 
by the following examples of the recent experiences of emerging important emitters 
in terms of key mitigation policies, particularly with regard to energy prices and 
green fiscal reform.
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The difficulty in abolishing the harmful and wasteful common practice of grant-
ing fossil fuel subsidies in many developing countries exemplifies the political econ-
omy barriers to low-carbon transformation. Fuel subsidies not only impose high 
costs on state budgets – in 2011 India and China spent about USD 34 billion and 
USD 20 billion, respectively, on subsidising energy consumption (OECD-IEA 2014) 
– and undermine efforts to decarbonise energy systems, they also reduce incentives 
for energy efficient consumption and production. Furthermore, fossil fuel subsidies 
are not an efficient instrument to fight poverty. Instead, they have been found to be 
regressive and typically disproportionately benefit richer households. Nevertheless, 
energy subsidy reforms often face public opposition since price rises of important 
energy items, such as petrol, scare large parts of the population more than the un-
equal distribution of subsidies.
Indonesia has long been a case in point, as energy prices for households there 
have been set below international market price levels by successive governments 
for decades. In years with high oil prices, this has resulted in massive subsidy pay-
ments, accounting for up to 35 per cent of total government spending. As a result 
of this fiscal pressure, various governments tried to reduce energy subsidies over 
time but faced public opposition when subsidy cuts were implemented. Facilitated 
by dramatically falling oil prices in 2014, the newly elected government announced 
a complete phaseout of energy subsidies. Since then, gasoline has been sold at a 
price closer to international market prices. Although other energy sources, such 
as electricity and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), remain heavily subsidised, there 
are plans to reduce subsidies for these in the future as well. If the government were 
to pursue an even more ambitious climate policy by levying taxes on fossil energy, 
richer Indonesians would be hit harder than the poor since they use more gasoline 
and electricity. However, this does not imply that the poor would not be affected. 
With the current growth in electrification and private motorised transport, a larger 
part of the population is projected to benefit from low energy prices. In any case, 
the energy subsidy cuts which are currently being implemented have had negligible 
effects on emissions since the price of oil remains at low levels. Should oil prices rise 
again, the political feasibility of abolishing energy subsidies will be put to the test. 
In contrast to many other middle-income countries, Mexico has signalled a 
strong commitment to achieving climate mitigation targets. It was the first develop-
ing country to pass a climate change law in 2012, well in advance of the Paris agree-
ment. Relative to emissions in 2000, Mexico wants to reduce its emissions by 30 
per cent by 2020 and by 50 per cent by 2050. Despite the ambitious targets, there 
is no official plan on how to achieve these goals. The recently introduced battery of 
energy taxes, often termed the “Mexican carbon tax,” could serve as the basis of fur-
ther policy steps – though the current tax rates are too small to make any measur-
able difference to emissions. In the Mexican case, future tax increases may also hurt 
the rich more than the poor since direct energy demand, in particular for gasoline, 
is higher for richer households. 
A carbon tax is also at the centre of national climate policy debates in South Af-
rica. While originally planned to be implemented in 2013, the country’s carbon tax 
legislation has been on hold since then. When the tax will be introduced and details 
about the size of the tax, the tax base, and possible exemptions all remain unclear. 
Considering the particularly high carbon intensity of the South African power sec-
tor and the abundance of cheap domestic coal, it is hardly surprising that the gov-
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ernment is in no hurry to start the decarbonisation process through this important 
fiscal instrument. South Africa is thus likely to maintain its status as the highest per 
capita emitter amongst developing countries for the foreseeable future. 
There are a number of other middle-income countries with quickly rising GHG 
emissions which have moderately ambitious climate targets (as announced in their 
INDCs) but often have little to say about specific policies. Thailand, for example, 
has an almost complete absence of legislation dealing with climate policy but has 
a reduction target of 20 per cent by 2030 relative to a baseline scenario. Like in 
plenty of other countries, it is simply unclear how reduction targets can be achieved 
in an environment of clear development priorities and a lack of political will to deal 
with, inter alia, environmental issues. 
Certainly, ambitious climate policies have the potential to create serious trade-
offs vis-à-vis development objectives. The identification of compensation schemes 
in the absence of universal income tax systems is one major challenge, but more 
critical issues wait behind the climate policy curtain. For most developing coun-
tries, price increases for modern cooking fuels have adverse income effects for the 
poor, but this is not the only problem. Low-income households may quickly switch 
to traditional fuels (e.g. wood, dung, or charcoal) should the price of modern en-
ergy rise. This response creates two additional problems which cannot be directly 
addressed by redistribution mechanisms. First, the use of traditional fuels usually 
comes with indoor pollution and associated negative health outcomes. Second, tra-
ditional biofuels potentially put more pressure on land use and deforestation, which 
then negatively affects the emission balance of climate policy. Leaving energy sup-
ply for households subject to market forces does not appear to be the right answer 
in this case. Governments will have to make sure that modern energy remains af-
fordable to the population while addressing climate protection. 
Lessons Learnt: Focus on Feasible Mitigation Actions That Matter
The above account shows the urgent need for more ambitious mitigation actions in 
developing countries. It also illustrates the challenges of implementing such actions 
in the context of important trade-offs between mitigation and economic develop-
ment. As exemplified by Mexico and South Africa, it is not primarily a matter of 
(the lack of) political or administrative capacity to introduce climate policies – a 
domestic carbon tax is technically not more complicated than existing tax regula-
tions. The actual problems arise when effective climate policies have real impacts 
on the energy sector and the economy at large. These impacts bear potential risks, 
such as adverse effects on poverty through higher consumption prices, lower wages, 
or unemployment, which are likely to be unpopular and thus prevent governments 
from acting. 
More ambitious national climate policies in developing countries are thus un-
likely to materialise in the absence of international support from industrialised 
countries. This support, subsumed under the term climate finance, is a key element 
of current climate change talks. The international community aims to mobilise USD 
100 billion a year for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. Much of 
the discussion on climate finance has centred on the question of how much devel-
oped countries should pay and where the money should come from (Steckel et al. 
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2016). This discussion must now shift to the question of how developing countries 
can be supported in implementing more ambitious climate policies. 
Along these lines, an international coalition of governments, institutions, and 
civil society groups announced the NDC Partnership at the Marrakech climate con-
ference in November 2016. Co-chaired by Germany and Morocco, this new initiative 
claims to provide a support centre for developing country governments that are 
willing to implement climate policies. Although such initiatives are well intentioned 
and move the agenda in the right direction, such small-scale project-based strate-
gies fail to address the order of magnitude of the problem. Effective climate policies 
that achieve measurable effects will require increasing prices for carbon intensive 
energy and goods through market-based instruments, such as carbon taxes or emis-
sion trading schemes. International cooperation should support this type of reform 
by providing transparent and clear support mechanisms. One practical mechanism 
could be providing developing countries with direct budget support which is con-
ditional on them implementing policies that reduce GHG emissions. Such grants 
could be administered through a new organisation (e.g. a climate fund) or through 
existing multilateral institutions (e.g. the World Bank or regional development 
banks). 
Unfortunately, the currently discussed USD 100 billion for both mitigation and 
adaption will not be enough. If the rich citizens of the world want to leave their chil-
dren and grandchildren a world with a stable climate, they will have to pay for it. 
Ideally, they will do so in the most efficient way: by supporting mitigation efforts in 
developing countries where the costs of reducing GHGs are typically much smaller 
than in richer economies. With time running out, getting to know the real costs both 
of ambitious climate stabilisation targets and of emissions in developing countries 
should be a priority for governments in developed countries. These efforts should 
include providing climate finance to low-income countries despite their low emis-
sion levels. For these countries, decarbonisation processes should be started earlier 
to avoid the costly lock-in effects associated with replacing fossil fuel power plants 
and the corresponding infrastructure. 
The single pieces of national climate policies could at some point be combined 
to form an international carbon market that would guarantee emission stabilisation 
in the long run. In the meantime, developed countries should not limit their mitiga-
tion efforts to supporting developing countries’ climate policies. They also need to 
speed up their own rates of decarbonisation and to invest more in advancing renew-
able energy technologies, as the current cost differences between fossil fuels and 
renewables are still the major obstacle to decarbonising the global energy system. 
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